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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini adalah bertujuan untuk mengenalpasti jenis dan kepentingan kesan urus 
takbir korporat ke atas hubungan di antara perbelanjaan penyelidikan dan pembanguan (R&D) 
bagi tahun 2005 dan percapaian firma yang diukur dengan keuntungan atas ekuiti (Return on 
Equity) dan keuntungan atas aset (Return on Asset) bagi tahun-tahun 2005, 2006 dan 2007. 
Analisa dijalankan ke atas syarikat yang tersenarai di pasaran Mesdaq, papan utama dan 
padan kedua Burma Malaysia bagi tahun 2005. Keputusan bagi hubungan terus menunjukkan 
perbelanjaan R&D mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan nilai purata ROE dan ROA. Ini 
mungkin disebabkan oleh perbelanjaan R&D yang besar mengakibatkan keuntungan firma 
menjadi lebih rendah. Berkenaan dengan ciri-ciri urus tadbir korporat, keputusan menunjukan 
hanya kekerapan mesyuarat ahli lembaga pengarah menunjukan hubungan negatif dengan 
nilai purata ROE. In mungkin disebabkan oleh mesyuarat-mesyuarat yang tidak efektif. 
Dengan menggunakan teknik “moderated regression analysis”, didapati interaksi di antara 
perbelanjaan R&D dan pampasan kepada pengarah menunjukan kesan positif ke atas 
hubungan di antara perbelanjaan R&D dan dengan nilai purata ROE dan ROA. Ini mungkin 
disebabkan pampasan memotivasi dan menggalakan pengarah untuk meningkatkan 
percapaian firma. Tambahan lagi, interaksi di antara perbelanjaan R&D dan frekuensi 
mesyuarat juga menunjukan kesan positif. Ini mungkin disebabkan pengarah mempunyai 
lebih banyak masa untuk berbincang mengenai perlaksanaan projek R&D.  Rumusannya, para 
pelabur perlu menganalisa ciri-ciri urus takbir korporat apabila menilai pelaburan R&D yang 
dibuat oleh firma. Ini dapat membantu pelabur dalam mengenalpasti samada pelaburan R&D 
itu memberi kesan positif ke atas percapaian firma. 
 x 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the nature and significance of the moderating effects of firm’s 
board governance on the relationship between innovation (R&D) expenditure for year 2005 
and firm future performance measured by average Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on 
Assets (ROA) for year 2005 to 2007. A cross-sectional analysis of firms listed in the Mesdaq, 
main and second board of Bursa Malaysia for the year 2005 is utilized. Result from the direct 
effect reveals that R&D expenditures have significant negative effects on the average ROE 
and ROA. The reasonable explanation is that it could be due to the huge R&D expenditures 
cause the return for the year to be inferior. In respect of corporate governance characteristics, 
only the frequency of board meetings has a significant negative relationship with ROE. The 
negative relationship may be due to the ineffectiveness of the meetings. Furthermore, using 
moderated regression analyses, the interaction effect of R&D expenditures with board 
compensation provide significant positive effect.  This could be due to compensation is a 
major source of motivation and encouragement for the directors to improve firm performance. 
Furthermore, the interaction of board meeting and R&D expenditures also show significant 
positive effect on the relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performance. The 
reasonable explanation is that directors will have more time spend on discussing the R&D 
projects’ progress and difficulties. In conclusion, it can be proposed that investors should take 
into account the corporate government characteristics such board compensation and frequency 
of board meetings when evaluating the R&D investment made by the firms. This will help to 
determine whether such as R&D investment would be able to generate positive contribution 
toward firm future performance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This chapter discusses the background of the study concerning the moderating effect 
of corporate governance on the relationship between innovation expenditures and firm 
performance. It gives an introduction to the study that discusses the background of the study, 
research objectives, research question and the contribution of the study to the society.  
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
 Agency theory explains the relationship between the principal who is the owner of the 
economic resources and the agent who is the controller and manager of the resources (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). In addition, agency theory was developed based on the assumption that 
the agents have more information than the principals, which caused difficulty to the principals 
in monitoring the agents effectively (Adams, 1994). Due to the advantage of having more 
information on the economic resources, the agents tend to maximize their self-interest rather 
than the owners’ wealth (Scapen, 1985). In this connection, corporate governance has been 
applied by most of organization as a set of mechanisms to influence the decisions made by 
agents when there is a separation of ownership and control. By having good corporate 
governance practices, managerial opportunism can be reduced. One of the areas where 
managerial opportunism can occur is innovation investment described as Research & 
Development (R&D). This is because the managers may manipulate R&D investment when 
there is a conflict of interest between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers) 
of the firms. For instance, shareholders may be interested to see that the organization 
rigorously involves in R&D activities in order to ensure that the firm performance in future 
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will be improved. However, lack of experiences and time spent in the R&D activities may 
cause managers to spend the financial resources inefficiently and ineffectively by having 
unproductive costly meetings. Besides, R&D is one of the significant areas within any 
corporate entity as could determine the future performance of the firms. Wang and Chang 
(2005) mention that previous studies have found that R&D expenditures are not only 
influence current performance and market value but also future performance. 
In relation R&D expenditures in Malaysian market, based on the survey conducted by 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation Malaysia, the Research and Development 
(R&D) expenditure has been steadily and consistently grow since 1996. In relation to private 
sectors which are the major contributor toward R&D activities in Malaysia, the expenditure 
has increased by RM400.5 million, from RM1.63 billion in 2002 to RM2.03 billion in 2004. 
This phenomenon indicates that more and more companies put a greater emphasis on R&D 
activities. However, the impact of the R&D investment on the firms’ performance has yet to 
conclude. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 
 Innovation is one of the important aspects for company growth particularly for 
technology-based firms. Prior studies find that innovation expenditures are relatively 
significant in determining firm performance particularly in technological based industry 
(Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Chen,Cheng & Hwang, 2005). As such, innovation can be 
viewed as one of the most powerful competitive weapons in the business operations (Wang & 
Chang, 2005). Generally, day-to-day business operations are handled by a group of 
management team appointed by the shareholders of the firm. Management team is expected to 
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maximize the shareholder wealth in making business decisions such as innovation 
expenditures. However, due to divergent goals and risk preferences, the management team 
tends to maximize their compensation rather than the shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently, the firm performance could be adversely 
affected such as the collapse of Enron in US and Marconi in UK (Khanchel, 2007). Following 
from these phenomena, increasing attention are given in relation to monitoring the 
management team by the shareholders through corporate governance mechanism. Previous 
studies have identified the corporate governance mechanism which will help in ensuring the 
management team make strategic business decisions such as innovation expenditures that will 
maximize shareholders’ wealth (Walsh & Steward, 1990 and Shleifer & Vishnu, 1997). As 
such, the application of corporate governance could potentially affect the relationship 
between, innovation expenditures and firm performance. As mentioned by Le, Walters and 
Kroll (2006) previous studies in relation to corporate governance mechanism have empirically 
proven that the relationship between R&D expenditure and firm performance can be 
influenced by managerial opportunism. (Zahra, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Tihanyi et 
al, 2003;). The existence of managerial opportunism due to divergent goals and risk 
preferences between the managers and owners of the firm whereby managers run the firm in a 
way that will maximize their benefits rather than the owners’ value (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). One of ways that managerial opportunism can be practiced is 
through R&D expenditures since it plays an increasing role in business nowadays (Chen, 
Cheng & Hwang, 2005). One of the examples for managerial opportunism is that the 
management team engaging inexperienced R&D consultants based on the personal 
relationship rather than their capabilities. By imposing corporate governance mechanism, it 
will help to ensure that managers will to make decisions in relation to R&D expenditures that 
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will maximize shareholder values (Walsh & Steward, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In this 
connection, this study is conducted to examine the moderating impact of the corporate 
governance mechanism on the relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performance. 
 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of the research are stated as follows:-:- 
1) to examine the relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performance in  
Malaysia; 
2)  to assess the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm 
performance in Malaysia; and 
3) to investigate the moderating effect of corporate governance practices on the 
relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performance. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
 Subsequent to the above research objectives, the following research questions are 
necessary to be addressed:- 
1) Does R&D expenditures affect firm future performance? 
2)  Does corporate governance practice have an impact on firm performance? 
3) Does corporate governance practice affect the relationship between R&D expenditures 
and organizational performance? 
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
 The findings of the study may contribute the knowledge to the financial literatures 
particularly for investors to apply in making investment decision. The following is the 
significance of the study:-  
1) Provide information on the potential impact of R&D expenditures on the firm 
performance which will assist investors in making decision on strategic investments; 
2) Provide information in relation to the effectiveness corporate governance mechanism 
that will help investors to predict future firm performance; and 
3) Provide information to the firms’ shareholders in relation to corporate governance 
practices which will assist them prevent managerial opportunism; 
4) Provide information to the investors in relation to effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices in relation to firms R&D investment.  
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
 
The study is divided into five sections and the outline of the remaining chapters is as 
follows:- 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 This chapter presents the review of the related literature in relation to the theories 
and empirical evidence pertaining to corporate governance, R&D expenditures and the effect 
of corporate governance, R&D expenditures on firm performance.  The discussion on the 
corporate governance is focused on corporate governance characteristics such board size, 
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board meeting, independent directors and CEO duality. In addition, the theoretical framework 
as well as hypotheses development is also discussed in this chapter.   
Chapter 3: Research Methodology  
The chapter provides discussion on research methodology and the model used in 
the study. This chapter outlines the sample used in the study, the measurement of the variables 
applied in the study and also the statistical techniques used in examining the moderating effect 
of corporate governance on the relationship between R&D expenditure and firm performance. 
Chapter 4: Results and Data Analysis  
 The chapter outlines the descriptive statistics along with results for  regression  
analysis. The result from the SPSS are summarized and tabled comprehensive format. The 
interpretation of the results are discussed and justified by comparing with the previous studies. 
Finally, the results are summarized by using the hypotheses developed in the study.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion  
The final chapter presented the key empirical findings and compares the findings 
for the different models used in the study and the implications of such findings. In addition, it 
also explains the limitation of the study. Based on the current study, the recommendation for 
future research is also suggested in this chapter. The section is the conclusion of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter presents the review of the related literature in relation to the relevant 
theory  and empirical evidence pertaining to corporate governance, innovation and firm 
performance. The first section explains the essence of agency theory and prior studies in 
relation principal-agent relationship. The second section discussed the concept of corporate 
governance and the corporate governance mechanism such as board size, board meeting, 
independent directors, CEO duality and compensation. The third section highlights the 
meaning of innovation and factors for successful innovation. The fourth section discusses on 
the instruments in measuring firm performance. The final section discusses on the relationship 
between corporate governance, innovation and firm performance. The review of the above 
leads to the construction of the theoretical framework for this study. 
 
 
2.1 Agency Theory 
 
 
Berle and Means’ (1932) Principal-Agent model underpins the philosophy of the 
modern theory of the firm and many models of corporate governance. The agency theory 
evolved from the problem arises from the separation of ownership and control whereby the 
controllers of the economics resources pursue their own aims and serve their own interest at 
the expense of owners of the resources (Berle & Means, 1932). As such, the main elements of 
agency theory are the principal and agent in which the principal is the owner of the economics 
resources who authorizes the agent to manage and control their economic resources in the 
manner that will maximize their wealth.  According to Jensen and Mechling (1976), in order 
to solve principal-agent relationship problem, agency cost will be incurred. Basically there are 
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two major problems in respect to principal-agent relationship. Firstly, it is difficult or 
expensive for the principals to verify what the agents are doing. Secondly, principals and 
agents prefer different actions due to different attitudes toward risks (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). 
As explained by Adams (1994), The agent, will have full knowledge in relation to the 
economics resources and the authority in utilizing the resources. Due to the knowledge 
possessed by the agent, information transfer process is one of major aspects in the principal-
agent relationship which could lead to information asymmetry problem (Arrow, 1962). Quinn 
and Doherty (2000) explain that the asymmetry problem is due to the agents who have 
detailed knowledge on the operation as they are controlling the daily operations. On the other 
hand, the principals may not have the knowledge on the operations or may not be able to 
interpret the information in the perfect manner. Quinn and Doherty (2000) further explain that 
the information asymmetry is not a problematic issue in the principal-agent relationship. The 
issue arises when the principals and agents pursuing different goals in relation to the 
economics resources. The incongruent goals may lead the agent to utilize the information  in 
the manner that will detriment the principals. 
Furthermore, Ardalan (2007) highlights that there are three sources of conflict of the 
interest between the managers (agents) and the owners (principals). The first source of 
conflict of interest is when the manager interested to remain in power even when the owners 
have not required them to remain in the position. The second source of conflict is in relation 
to the difference in the investment policy. For example, shareholder usually holds a 
diversified portfolio so that a relatively small portion of his wealth is invested in any company 
to minimize the risks. However, the manager may prefer majority of the capital tied up in the 
firm. Therefore, if the project fails, a manager will lose more than a shareholder. Due to 
differences in investment policy, the shareholder and the manager caught into conflict of 
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interests. The final source of conflict is in respect of the availability of excess cash flow 
whereby the owners prefer that cash to be distributed to them. On the other hand, the 
managers may either retain the cash flow or invest it in negative NPV projects. In addition, 
Downes and Russ (2005) states that in certain cases, agents act unethically by taking 
advantage of the information asymmetry and use their position to pursue their personal 
agendas rather than the principals. These agents are capable to hide and distort information in 
the manner that will appear as pursuing in the best interest of the principals. They propose that 
as a measure to reduce the incidences and agents misbehavior, the principals should establish 
a governance mechanism that will foresee and monitor the agents’ action in their daily 
operation activities. By having effective corporate governance, it will minimize the agency 
problem by promoting the agents interest in the firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance refers to a mechanism which outlines the set of rules and 
procedures in managing the relationship between shareholders, company management, Board 
of Directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. The main 
objective is to ensure that the management of the organization behaves in the best interest of 
the owner of the organization[Report on the Observence of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 
2005]. As Fama (1983) points out, corporate governance helps to promote organization 
performance and economic growth through specialization of investment and management. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) view corporate governance as a method on ensuring the capital 
investment made by the owner of the organization are appropriately compensated.  According 
to Gillan and Starks (1998), corporate governance is a system of laws, rules and factors that 
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control operation of organizations. Based on the above definitions, it can be concluded 
corporate governance is a mechanism that can be used by the owner of the organization to 
ensure the manager of the organization operates the organization in the way that will increase 
the owner’s wealth. Since the owner of the organization has different objectives as compared 
to owner of other organizations, the implementation of corporate governance is different from 
one another. 
 In relation to corporate governance in Malaysia, the establishment of Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance in 1998 has led to the issuance of Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) to provide guidelines on the principles, direction for the 
implementation as well as the best practices of the corporate governance. Currently, besides 
MCCG by Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, Capital Market Master Plan (CMP) 
by Securities Commission and Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) by Bank Negara 
Malaysia are also the main sources of the corporate governance practices in Malaysia. In 
addition, the establishment of institutional development such as Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (MICG) and the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
further assist in developing the awareness and practice of good corporate governance in 
Malaysia. The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (2000) has applied the following 
definition of corporate governance in Malaysia:- 
“ Process & structure used to direct & manage business & affairs of the  
company towards enhancing business prosperity & corporate accountability  
with ultimate objective of realizing  long term shareholder value, whilst 
taking into account  the interests of other stakeholders” 
Based on the above, the committee views that corporate governance is not just considering 
shareholder but also stakeholders’ interests.  
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However, in 2007, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Revised 2007) has 
been released to replace the existing regulations issued in March 2000. The main objective is 
to strengthen Malaysia's corporate governance framework and improvise it as per current 
global best practice. Basically, the revisions strengthen the roles and responsibilities of Boards 
of Directors and Audit Committees and aim to ensure the effective performance of roles. The 
revisions also specify the eligibility criteria for the appointment of Directors, the composition 
of the Boards and the role of the Nomination Committee. Based on the new regulations, 
Independent non-Executive Directors should continue to make up at least one-third of the 
members of the Board and that there should be a more meaningful and independent oversight 
function. Nomination Committee should appoint in relation to the appointments and 
reappointments of the Board. Nomination Committee is expected to evaluate the 
professionalism and integrity of each Director. The Committee should also make sure that 
Board members possess basic skills, knowledge, expertise and experience to perform their 
roles and responsibilities. In addition, the revised Code strengthens the regulations on the role 
of Audit Committees to ensure that they carry out an effective audit on firm’s managers. The 
new rules cover the composition of Audit Committees, the frequency of meetings and the 
need for audit committee members to attend continuous training to keep abreast with 
developments in relevant financial and other related developments. Executive Directors are 
excluded from membership in order to ensure the independence of the Audit Committee. 
Furthermore, the following discussions will focus on the widely used governance mechanisms 
in academic researches. 
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2.2.1 Corporate Governance Mechanism 
According to Ardalan (2007), corporate governance mechanism might reduce the 
agency effect and generally, there are four broad categories of corporate governance 
mechanism as follows:- 
1) Legal and regulatory mechanisms 
This category emphasizes on the system of laws and regulations that govern the firm. 
In making decision on ownership structure, capital markets, financing, and dividend policies 
by the managers, the shareholders will be protected by this system of laws and regulations. 
2) Internal control mechanisms 
This category focuses on the board of director structure, compensation plan, the firm’s 
ownership structure and the firm’s debt structure. The components of this category are 
constructed on the basis that it will pursue shareholder interest. 
3) External control mechanisms 
Under this category, the managers are given the threat of losing control if the case 
where their management has deviated from pursuing the shareholder interest. 
4) Product market competition 
The poor product market performance will demonstrate inefficiency of the 
management. As such, the shareholders will be to evaluate whether the decisions made by the 
managers are based on their interest. 
On different perspectives, according to Gillan (2006), corporate governance mechanism 
falls into two groups, namely, those internal to the firm and those external to the firm. These 
two groups can be illustrated by the following Figure 1-1:- 
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    Source: Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, 2005 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Balance sheet model 
 
The above balance sheet model indicates two groups of corporate governance mechanism 
whereby the left-hand side shows the components for internal governance and the right-hand 
side shows the components for the external governance. In respect of the internal governance, 
the board of directors is responsible for advising and monitoring management team who is 
given the authority to manage the firm (Jensen, 1993). On the right hand side is the elements 
for the external governance arising from the firm’s need to raise capital. The separation 
between those who provide the capital and those who utilize the capital lead to the demand for 
corporate governance mechanism. 
 In this connection, the current studies focus on the internal corporate governance 
mechanism, namely board size, number of board meetings, number of independence directors, 
CEO duality and board compensation. According to Gillan (2006), board size, number of 
board meetings, CEO duality and number of independence directors are categorized as 
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structure of board of directors. On the other hand, board compensation is categorized as 
managerial incentives.  
 
2.3 Innovation 
 
 Innovation has been viewed in different dimension in the previous studies. According 
to Lall (1992), innovation capability refers to the ability to enhance existing technology for 
producing new product through effective utilization and improvement of existing skills and 
knowledge. In addition, innovation has been defined as an outcome of a product 
commercialization after gone through an orderly process of design, development and 
completion or refinement (MacPherson, 1997). Syhu and Chiu (2002) refine MacPherson 
(1997)’s definition of innovation into a broader scope whereby innovation is consisting of 
series of activities in the areas of science, technology, organization, finance and commerce. 
Meanwhile, Wadhwa, Bhoon and Chan (2006) regard innovation as evident by 
successful commercialization of a product. However, Huang and Lin (2006) comment that 
successful commercialization of product relies on the marketing efforts conducted by the 
marketing teams. As such, innovation should be measured up to the point where a marketable 
product is successfully produced. Based the above studies, it can be summarized that 
innovation expenses should be measured up to the point where the product is successfully 
generated and available for commercialization. 
According to Feldman and Martin (2004), the study of innovation and economic 
growth began in earnest in the late 1950s with the work of Robert Solow (1959) who has 
empirically demonstrated that technological change was the major factor for economic growth 
in the American economy during the 1909 to 1949. Feldman and Martin (2004) explain that 
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economic growth is resulted from the ability to extract greater economic value through 
science and technology.  
 According to Panne, Beers and Kleinknecht (2003), the successful innovation based on 
the following factors: - 
1) Firm related factors 
Firm related factors could be classified into four factors which are discussed as follows:- 
a) Firm culture 
 A culture susceptible to innovation plays important for the firm to engage in the 
innovation activities  (Lester, 1998). By encouraging innovation initiatives by the firms will 
help to demonstrate the significance of innovation to the firms. Johne and Snelson states 
firm’s cultural susceptibility can be further strengthen by having mission statement which 
emphasizes on the value of product development to the firm.  
b) Experience with innovation 
Firm previous experiences in the engagement of innovation projects would create a 
conducive environment for future innovation activities (Stuart & Abetti, 1987). This is true 
since the experiences will improve the innovation skills. According to Zirger (1997), learning-
by-doing and learning-by-failing effects are two crucial phenomena in the product learning 
cycle. The experiences in both phenomena will help the firm to improve the efficiency and 
identify the weaknesses in the innovation activities. 
c) Characteristics of R&D team 
According to Panne, Beers and Kleinknecht (2003), firm’s R&D capabilities are 
affected by several characteristics of R&D teams. One of the characteristics is the team’s 
configuration which project’s viability can be improved by having interdisciplinary (Roure & 
Keeley, 1990).  
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Another significant characteristic is attendance of a product champion (Panne, Beers and 
Kleinknecht, 2003). By having an individual acting as innovation-dedicated internal 
entrepreneur within the R&D team, there will more chances for successful innovation  (Link, 
1987). The champion would be able to confront with internal resistance to innovation. In addition, 
the product champion will be acting as efficient technology gatekeeper in relation to the firm’s 
scientific information (Rothwell, 1992).  
(d) Firm strategy towards innovation 
According to Lester (1998), articulated innovation strategy is crucial for firm innovation 
activities since it provides a guidelines in dealing with strategic issues such as market selection 
and skills required for development. In addition, the advantage of synergy between similar 
projects can be achieved by having strategically planned projects (Rothwell, 1992). Besides, 
Rothwell (1992) also states that skills acquired through learning-by-doing can be applied to the 
future projects through proper plans. Another study by Cottam et al. (2001) finds that providing 
strategic direction to the innovation activities, the benefits of previous studies can be utilized in 
the future innovation activities. 
2) Project related factors; 
Project related factors could be categorized into two aspects which are discussed as 
follows:- 
a) Complementary 
According to Maidique & Zirger (1984), firm’s resources such as management and 
market research skills, sales, distribution, R&D and production facilities will determine the 
prospect of the firm’s innovation efforts. Previous studies find that synergy between R&D and 
marketing capabilities are crucial for innovation success. Cooper, 1983 and Link, 1987). In 
addition, synergy can be maximized by focusing on innovation within the product group 
customers are already familiar with (Hopkins,1981).  
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b) Innovation management style 
Cozijnsen et al. (2000) finds that 60% of the innovation project’s viability is determined 
by adequate time management, cost, information and decision-making. Crawford (1991, p.27) 
suggests that by splitting the project by constituent phases, the project can be more manageable. 
Whin and Wahajan (1998) states that failure of projects could be due to skipping of phases. 
According to Panne, Beers and Kleinknecht (2003), there two significant phases in the 
innovation projects, namely, planning and evaluation. During the planning phases, 
uncertainties are clarified into clear tasks and responsibilities (Maidique & Zirger, 1985). While 
during evaluation phases, the viability of innovation projects can be identified (Mansfield & 
Wagner, 1975).  
3) Product related factors 
Mansfield & Wagner, 1975 stated that price and products are two significant factors in 
relation to a product. They add that consumer satisfaction determinants such as quality, relative 
price, total-costs-of-use, convenience-of-use, after-sales services, and backward compatibility are 
significant in order to determine innovation success. 
4) Market related factors. 
According to Hopkins, 1981 competitive advantage can be achieved by through early 
introduction of products into the market. As such, Wind & Mahajan (1988) recommends that 
innovation process should be expedited in order for the product can be introduced earlier to the 
market. However, Hultink (1998) suggests that the quality of the products should also be 
emphasized during early introduction of the products.      
In relation innovation (R&D) expenditures in Malaysian market, based on the survey 
conducted by Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation Malaysia, the Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditure has been steadily and consistently grow since 1996. In 
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respect of private sectors which are the major contributor toward R&D activities in Malaysia, 
the expenditure has increased by RM400.5 million, from RM1.63 billion in 2002 to RM2.03 
billion in 2004. In addition, other factors related to R&D activities such as human capital have 
also increased. The headcount of R&D personnel and researchers have increased 
tremendously which was approximately 70% and 80% respectively. The results of the survey 
are shown in the following Table 2-1. In this connection, it can be summarized that R&D 
activities have gained significant attention among the firms in the private sectors. As such, 
R&D could be one of the areas that potentially provide significant positive impact on firm 
performance in the future. 
 
Table 2-1 
R&D in Private Sector 
R&D IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
R&D Expenditure 2004 2002 
Total Expenditure RM2,033.6M RM1,633.1M 
Current Expenditure RM1,599.1M RM932.7M 
           - Labour Cost RM578.5M RM248.9M 
           - Operating Cost RM1,020.6M RM683.8M 
Capital Expenditure RM434.5M RM700.3M 
Human Resources in R&D 2004 2002 
Headcount of R&D Personnel 8,737 5,177 
Headcount of Researches 5,940 3,349 
Headcount of Technicians & Support Staff  2,797 1,828 
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2.4    Firm Performance 
 
  Basically, firm performance can be categorized into market returns and accounting 
returns. Both measurements have it own advantages and disadvantages. It has been argued 
that accounting return is more relevant measure of firm performance since it is a product of 
governance process (Sloan, 2001). However, accounting based performance measures do not 
capture all consequences of agency conflict (Azim and Shailer, 2003). As such, it may not be 
conclusive. On the other hand, market performance measures are considered more robust on 
the basis of they are not subjected to any management manipulation. However, it is argued 
that market performance measures are not efficient measures due to uncontrollable factors 
such economic downturn (Dalton et al, 1999). Due to these arguments, various types of 
measurement for firm performance have been applied in the previous studies. Chen, Cheng 
and Hwang (2005) uses market-to-book value ratio and Return on Equity (ROE) as the 
measure of firm performance in their study in respect of the relationship between intellectual 
capital and firm’s market value and financial performance. In addition, Wang and Chang 
(2005) in their study on intellectual capital and performance measure firm performance used 
both ROA and ROE as part of other performance variables. Furthermore, lagged 3-year 
average total shareholder return has been used as measure of firm performance by Le, Walters 
and Kroll (2006) in their study on the moderating effect of external monitors on the 
relationship between R&D spending and firm performance.  In earlier study conducted by 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), firm performance is measured by equity capitalization plus 
total liabilities, all divided by total assets. In the recent study conducted by Cheng (2008), 
ROA is also used as one of the measures for firm performance. 
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Following from the above discussion on firm performance, the current study measures 
firm performance by referring to Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) as 
these measures are closely related to corporate governance mechanism (Dilova-Kirkowa, 
1999). The next section will discuss on prior empirical studies in relation to innovation, 
corporate governance and firm performance. 
 
2.5 Innovation, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
 This section will review the empirical studies on the relationship between 
innovation, corporate governance and firm performance. 
 
2.5.1      Innovation (R&D) Expenditure and Firm Performance 
 Earlier studies content that R&D investment is one of the significant factors for 
firms to stay competitive, particularly in the high-tech industry (Chan, Martin & Kensinger, 
1990). Li, Zhao and Liu (2006) comment that firm innovation is the basis of economic 
development and the necessary path for firm development. This is because employee’s 
productivity and efficiency can be improved through innovation (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; 
Lawless and Anderson, 1996). As such, technological innovation can improve firm 
performance (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Li and Deng, 1999). In this connection, Huang and 
Lin (2006) also comments that previous studies find that there is a significant and positive 
correlation between research and development (R&D) expenditures and business performance 
as well as market value (Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Hall, 1993; Chauvin and Hirschey, 
1993).  
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In the study conducted by Huang and Lin (2006), they find that there is positive 
relationship between R&D ratio and firm performance in the next period. This result is also 
consistent with earlier finding by Deeds (2001) who concludes that R&D intensity, the late 
period technology development capability, and technology absorption capability have a 
positive correlation with market value added.  
 This finding also supports previous study by Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) who 
concluded that R&D expenditures have consistently significant, positive influences on the 
market value whereby higher R&D expenditures attract higher expectation of future cash flow 
by the investors. In addition, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) also found that there is a significant 
inter-temporal association between firms’ R&D capital and subsequent stock returns. They 
suggest that this could be due to either systematic mispricing of the shares of R&D-intensive 
companies, or compensation for an extra-market risk factor associated with R&D. Another 
study performed by Shera and Yang (2005) shows that the improvement in the firm 
performance was resulted from higher the R&D intensity and higher R&D manpower. This 
indicates that there is positive relationship between R&D capabilities and firm performance. 
Their study consistent with the study conducted by Hitt et al (1997) who conclude that rapid 
technical change and increasing global competition have encourage firm to improve its ability 
to develop innovative new products and services as this will influence on long-term 
performance. 
 Furthermore, Cozzarin (2006) finds that firm with higher innovation expenditures tend 
to have a higher market share, labor productivity and price-cost margin. The result of the 
survey conducted is shown in the following Table 2-2. 
 However, in another study conducted by Chen, Cheng and Hwang (2005), they find 
that there is significant negative relationship between R&D expenditures ROE. They explain 
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that this could be due to R&D expenditure reduce the firms’ net income which lead to inferior 
financial performance. This could be the reason for Le et al (2006) measures firm 
performance in relation to the effect of R&D spending by taking lagged 3-year average total 
shareholder returns. In other words, the impact of R&D activities on firm performance may 
not be immediate. Instead there should be certain range of time period for the effect to be 
reflected on the firm performance. This could be true since the acceptance of new product by 
the market may require a great deal of promotion activities.  
Table 2-2 
Innovation performance survey 
Variable Innovation novelty 
 World Canada Firm Non-innovator 
 (Mean of performance variable 
Market share 0.42% 0.30% 0.19% 0.17% 
Labour productivity 109,728 98,422 83,033 86.841 
Price-cost margin 26.6% 25.2% 23.4% 22.9% 
Relative labour productivity 128.15% 114.35% 102.48% 106.56% 
Relative price-cost margin 108.79% 106.22% 98.2% 95.99% 
 
 2.5.2 Innovation (R&D) Expenditure and Board Size on Firm Performance. 
 Board size refers to the number of directors appointed to represent the overall 
shareholders in monitoring and supervising the management team. Previous studies suggest 
that in order for larger group to reach consensus it will require more efforts and subsequent 
decision are more compromise and less extreme ax compared to smaller group (Kogan and 
Wallach, 1966; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1991). Khanchel 
(2007) concludes that previous studies find that the size of the board has significant impact on 
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the quality of corporate governance. Cheng (2008) finds that the board size may affect the 
performance variability through it effect on R&D spending. This is due to the facts that firm 
with larger board size tend to be less likely involves with high-risk projects such as R&D 
activities. She added that for less-risk capital investment, board size is not a matter.  
However, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) find that smaller board size are more 
effective as compared to the larger board size due to free rider and monitoring problems. This 
finding consistent with the earlier finding by Yermack (1996) where there is negative 
relationship between board size and firm value to due to the larger board size tends to 
experience communication and coordination problem. 
 In Malaysia, MCCG recommends that decision on the board size should be based on 
requirement for board effectiveness. As such, there is no specified numbers of the board has 
been suggested. Nevertheless, the firms are encouraged to ensure that there is active 
participation and effective decision making process.  
 
2.5.3 Innovation (R&D) Expenditure and Board Independence (Outside Director) on 
Firm Performance. 
Board independence refers to the composition of outside directors in the board of 
directors. The proportion of outside directors can be measured by the ratio of outside directors 
to the board size.  
Based on the study conducted by Chung, Wright and Kedia (2002) to examine on how 
the corporate governance structure affect market valuation capital R&D investments, they find 
that there is significant and positive relationship between R&D investments and the firm value 
but only for firm with higher proportion of outside directors. This finding is supported by 
Adam and Mehran (2003) who conclude that firm performance can be improved by improving 
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the proportion of outside directors since they are more effective in monitoring manager 
performance.  
On the other hand, the R&D investments do not have significant impact of the firm 
value for the firms with smaller proportion of outside directors (Coles et al, 2007). Based on 
the findings, they suggest that the existence of outside directors in the board tend to better 
discipline managerial behavior. These finding consistent with the previous study by Fama and 
Jensen (1983) who conclude that by having higher fraction of independent outside directors, 
the managers activities and decision making will be more effectively monitored. Belden et al 
(2005) also confirm that outside directors are better monitors.  
In Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia listing requirements amendments released January 2001 
require at least one third of the board to comprise independent directors. The term 
independent as prescribed by the listing requirement and the Malaysian Governance Code 
refers to independence from management and independence from the significant shareholders.  
 
2.5.4 Innovation (R&D) Expenditure and Number of Board Meeting on Firm 
Performance 
 Generally, the main function of board of directors meeting is to engage face-to-face 
discussion in respect of firm performance.  
It has been suggested that the time spent on board meeting is important aspect in 
improving the effectiveness of the board (Coger et al, 1998). According to Shivdasani and 
Zenner (2004), where there is requirement for tight control and supervision, the board should 
be ready to increase the number of meetings frequency. Based on these findings, it can said 
that number of meeting will encourage the board of directors to discuss on the firm 
